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I. INTRODUCTION
Private equity (PE) firms are financial intermediaries standing between
the portfolio firms and their investors. They are typically organized as
closed-end funds aiming to overcome informational asymmetries and to
exploit specialization gains in selecting and overseeing portfolio firms.'
However, their existence as financial intermediaries creates new
informational asymmetries (with respect to the investors in the PE funds).
Fund managers raise follow-on funds before exiting their investments, and
may have incentives to overvalue their as-yet-unsold investments when
making disclosures to institutional investors. Despite strong incentives to
overvalue, PE funds do not face mandatory disclosure rules in any country
with a significant PE industry.2 Yet the overvaluation of unexited PE
investments has the potential to distort capital allocations to the PE industry
generally, and across PE funds in different countries around the world.
Disclosure of performance to the investor is burdened by two main
difficulties. On the one hand, valuation requires sufficient information on
the performance of the firm; on the other hand, even if sufficient
information is available, PE firms may disclose information strategically.
The main aim of this Article is to discuss these two issues in detail.
" Douglas Cumming, (B.Com. (Hons.), 1992, McGill University, M.A., 1993, Queen's
University, J.D., 1998, University of Toronto, Ph.D., 1999, University of Toronto, CFA,
2002) is an Associate Professor and the Ontario Research Chair at York University Schulich
School of Business, Toronto. Andrej Gill (MSc Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt) is
a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the Goethe University Frankfurt. Uwe Walz (MSc
Economics, University of Tiibingen, 1988, Ph.D. in economics, University of Tiibingen,
1992, Habilitation and venia legendi in economics, University of Mannheim, 1995) is the
Professor and Chair of Industrial Organization, Goethe University Frankfurt.
1 See William A. Sahlnan, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990).
2 See generally DAVID WALKER, DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN PRIVATE EQUITY:
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT JULY 2007 (2007).
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Disclosure takes place against the background of some decisive
features of the industry. The business of PE and most notably that of
venture capital funds is based on investments in highly uncertain ventures.3
These investments are illiquid because investment in the partnership may be
required to last for as long as ten years, so selling and buying takes place on
an irregular basis.4 Furthermore, in contrast to public equity markets there
is little regulation in the PE industry. 5
The relative importance of the valuation and disclosure topics,
especially between the PE fund (the general partner (GP)) and the investors
(the limited partners (LPs)) follows the developments in the industry in a
countercyclical manner. This was especially pertinent during the market
slides in the aftermath of the 2000 Internet boom. In such phases, investors
are more sensitive with regard to the valuation of the assets held by PE
firms and are seeking more information with respect to any possible write-
downs.
Given the illiquidity of the investment, current investors want to be
informed of the value of their investment. One reason for this is that the
investors, being either pension funds or other institutional investors, often
face disclosure requests as well.6 This conflict of interest between the PE
fund's desire for opaqueness and the investor's request for more
transparency and disclosure of information relating to performance became
most obvious in the course of the lawsuit against the Californian pension
fund CaiPERS. 7 In this lawsuit, CalPERS was forced by its stakeholders
and the outside public to disclose performance information on its
investments in various PE funds. 8 Subsequently, a number of PE funds
turned down CalPERS when it was willing to invest in said funds. 9
The valuation of investments is crucial not only for LPs currently
engaged in the PE fund but also for potential future investors considering
investing in the PE firm's follow-up funds. Hence, the decisive questions
3 In the following, we use the term "private equity" in its broad definition embracing
seed, early-stage, and expansion financing (to which we refer to as venture capital) as well as
late-stage investments (buy-outs). Thereby, we follow the definition of, e.g., the European
Venture Capital Association.
4 Douglas J. Cumming & Sofia A. Johan, Regulatory Harmonization and the
Development of Private Equity Markets, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 3218, 3222 (2007).
5 Id. at 3219; John R.M. Hand, The Value Relevance of Financial Statements in the
Venture Capital Market, 80 AccT. REV. 613, 618 (2005).
6 Cumming & Johan, supra note 4, at 3222.
7 See Susan Chaplinsky, CalPERS vs. Mercury News: Disclosure Comes to Private
Equity, (U. Va. Darden Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Case and Teaching Paper Series No.
UVA-F-1438, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=
909754.
' Id. at 2.
9 Id. at 4.
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are: What are the incentives for individual PE funds to truthfully report to
their investors and to what extent are existing industry guidelines helpful?
Is regulatory intervention necessary and potentially helpful? Can we
observe strategic misreporting, and if so, in which circumstances is it more
likely?
This Article will address these questions and provide an overview of
links between the valuation and disclosure issue in the PE industry (i.e.,
from the portfolio firm to the fund as well as between the PE fund and the
investors). Our main focus will be, however, on the valuation of unrealized
investments and GP's disclosure of this information to LPs. We will
analyze this against the background of theoretical arguments for and against
truthful disclosure as well as recent empirical evidence. Furthermore, we
will provide an overview of the institutional set-up as well as topical
developments in the countries with large PE markets. Last but not least, we
relate the accuracy of financial reporting of non-listed portfolio firms to the
valuation and disclosure of performance information from the PE fund to
investors. Throughout our entire discussion we focus only on disclosure of
performance-related information and neglect discussing other investment
related issues such as corporate governance, strategic job creation, or
destruction. 10
In order to stress the main issues even more clearly, it is helpful to
compare PE funds with mutual funds and hedge funds. Mutual funds and
hedge funds both invest in highly liquid assets. " While mutual funds pool
the capital of small investors, hedge funds attract a very limited number of
wealthy investors.12 Therefore, whereas there is a need to protect small
investors in mutual funds via regulation, such investor protection is not
regarded as an important issue with hedge funds. In contrast, PE funds pool
the money of their LPs (typically a small number of wealthy investors) and
invest it in highly illiquid assets. Hence, there is definitively less need to
protect small investors in the PE fund than in the mutual fund industry.
Nevertheless, there might be a reason to increase transparency.
This Article is structured as follows. First, in Section II, we provide an
overview of the institutional set-up and recently developed guidelines and
standards in the PE industry. In Section III, we will discuss the main
conflicts of interest standing against a voluntary and truthful disclosure of
financial information. We discuss circumstances where the valuation and
disclosure issues can be more properly approached by voluntary disclosure.
Furthermore, we discuss the costs and benefits of industry standards and
regulation in Section IV. In Section V, we briefly look into recent
10 See generally WALKER, supra note 2.
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empirical evidence on financial reporting and disclosure for unlisted
companies. Thereby, we ask how PE and venture capital involvement
affects the disclosure behavior of management in these firms. As a final
step, we discuss empirical evidence of the degree of potential misreporting
by the PE firms to their current investors. Lastly, Section VI summarizes
the main issues and concludes with the main implications of our analysis
and points to potential avenues for future research.
II. INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP
A. Valuation and Disclosure Rules for Privately-Held (Portfolio) Firms
PE funds are financial intermediaries channeling capital from their
investors to portfolio firms (see Figure 1 for a detailed illustration). Hence,
an obvious source for the disclosure of information of PE funds towards
their LPs is the information revealed by portfolio firms towards their
investors in general, and the PE firm in particular. Portfolio firms of PE
firms are typically not listed.13 While publicly-traded firms face rather
rigid financial reporting standards across the world, this is at least in part
significantly different for privately-held portfolio firms even if they have
limited liability status.
FIGURE 1: This figure shows how the information/investment-flows look in a PE-
environment.
In order to evaluate the degree of financial reporting and disclosure of
the portfolio firms of PE funds, we will provide a brief overview of the
financial reporting and disclosure rules applicable for privately-held firms
in the United States and the European Union.
In the United States, there are no mandatory financial reporting rules
13 Exceptions to this are cases where the PE funds have either invested in the course of a




for privately-held firms.14 While firms are therefore, in principal, free to
choose how and on which grounds they want to provide financial reporting,
most of them rely at least to some extent on the guiding principles of U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 15 The fact that they to
some extent voluntarily adhere to the existing U.S. GAAP guidelines is
mainly due to two factors.
The first underlying reason is the often-discussed effect of voluntary
disclosure on capital costs and the availability of capital, especially
corporate bonds and bank credit. 6 Firms need to create reports because
their outside creditors demand financial statements. To issue new credit,
banks need to make sure the firms can repay their loans. Most creditors
demand a financial statement that is audited by a certified public accountant
(CPA). The CPA attests that the firm's financial statements conform to
GAAP.' 7 A related matter is the desire to attract new financiers who
provide equity. In order to do so, even privately-held firms which do not
directly rely on the public equity markets need to reveal their profitability to
potential future investors. Secondly and relatedly, firms which are willing
to go public in the near future (thereby gaining access to public equity) are
required to hold financial statements which are U.S. GAAP consistent for at
least the last five years. 18 As a huge number of PE deals are exited via an
IPO, this may be an especially crucial motivation to PE funds to provide
sound financial statements. In a nutshell, this implies that a significant
number of privately held firms in the United States provide financial
statements which adhere to an extent with U.S. GAAP. Given the strong
position of PE investors, PE firms should be able to extract such financial
statements from their portfolio firms, forming the base for valuation of
portfolio firms and their disclosure. This ability to force portfolio firms to
reveal financial information is supported by Delaware Corporation law,
which entitles members of close corporations to substantial information.' 9
In the European Union, the Fourth Council Directive can be
interpreted as providing a lower bound for the reporting of non-listed
companies with limited liability in the European Union: "The annual
14 JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIC P.M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NON-
LISTED COMPANIES 43 (2008).
15 Id.
16 Michael Welker, Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity
Markets, 11 CONT. ACCT. REs. 801 (1995) (discussing empirical analysis on this effect for
publicly traded firms). See also Paul Healy, Amy Hutton & Krishna Palepu, Stock
Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Increases in Disclosure, 16 CONT.
ACCT. RES. 485 (1999).
17 O. RAY WHITTINGTON, WILEY CPA EXAMINATION REVIEW FAST TRACK STUDY GUIDE 3
(4th ed. 2008).
18 Hand, supra note 5, at 623.
19 MCCAHERY & VERMEULEN, supra note 14, at 43.
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accounts shall comprise the balance sheet, the profit and loss account and
the notes on the accounts. These documents shall constitute a composite
whole. 2 ° Hence, there is a minimum standard in the European Union
thereby differentiating the reporting requirements from their counterparts in
the United States, as they are based on a binding legal requirement and not
on voluntary disclosure, or an agreement between a company and its
investors/funds.21 In contrast, however, to U.S. GAAP which is based on
the notion of fair value and going concern, the European legal standards
rely on the notion of debtor protection. These European legal standards are
in contrast to the recently created industry-set standards, the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which are adopted by especially
large and listed firms.
On top of that, EU-based firms also need to disclose their financial
statements to the general public,22 although state laws may provide
exceptions to this: "The laws of a member state may, however, permit the
annual report not to be published as stipulated above. It must be possible to
obtain a copy of all or part *of any such report free of charge upon
request. 23
This does not practically differentiate the European way from that of
the United States. In the United States, the pressure to reveal the earnings
is simply applied from private organizations or companies instead of legal
requirements. 24
Overall, our discussion reveals that PE managers should have access to
sound financial data of their portfolio firms which, however, only depict
developments from the past rather than prediction for the future. Especially
for young and fast-growing firms, there is a big difference between the two.
Financial reports of portfolio firms limit the leeway of portfolio managers
when it comes to valuation. As a consequence, we should expect that the
quality of reporting standards in depicting fair value of the firm from a
going-concern perspective should appear in the valuation of PE firms vis-d-
vis their LPs.
B. Valuation and Disclosure Guidelines for Private Equity Funds
Valuation within the PE industry has always been a difficult task and
this is especially so for venture capital firms.2 Disclosure of (financial)
20 Fourth Council Directive 78/660, art. 2, para. 1, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11 (EU).
21 MCCAHERY & VERMEULEN, supra note 14, at 37-38.
22 Directive 2006/46, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1, 5 (EU).
23 Fourth Council Directive, supra note 20, art. 47.
24 Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure,
and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. AcCT. &
ECON. 405, 409-10 (2001).
25 JOSH LERNER, FELDA HARDYMON & ANN LEAMON, VENTURE CAPITAL & PRIVATE
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information and the valuation of (un-) realized investments in the PE
industry, whose companies are typically organized as partnerships, have not
been formally regulated around the world despite some recent discussion to
do so. 26 However, a number of industry guidelines have been proposed by
various committees and bodies in the recent past in order to diminish the
public perception of opacity within the industry and to avoid regulatory
moves. The main developments are outlined subsequently.
The first self-regulatory effort can be traced back to the National
Venture Capital Associations' (NVCA) attempt in 1990 to propose
guidelines for consistent valuations in the industry.27 The British Venture
Capital Association (BVCA) as well as the European Venture Capital
Organization (EVCA) followed suit in the early 1990s, proposing
guidelines for valuations and their disclosure from the GPs to the LPs of PE
funds. The basic notion in all of these guidelines was that the GP is better
informed and is therefore in charge of valuing portfolio companies.
Furthermore, the early valuation principle strongly relied on the idea of
valuation at the price of the most recent investment. This could either
imply a valuation at the cost of investment or, in cases in which further
investment rounds by other informed outside investors (other PE investors)
had taken place, using the price being paid in the last investment round.
In the aftermath of these first attempts towards the establishment of
formally non-binding industry guidelines, further versions of these
guidelines were published in order to further their development. These new
versions, especially the ones of the BVCA and the EVCA, moved in the
direction of "Fair Value" reporting.28  They were therefore mainly
concerned with the problem that, in a downward market, valuation at cost
prevents the need to write down the valuations in the PE's portfolio.
29
After many previously published guidelines in 1991, 1993, and 2001,
the International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines
(IPEV Guidelines), which form the joint guidelines of many regional
industry groups (except the NVCA), were published in their current version
EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 9 (4th ed. 2008).
26 This discussion is most advanced in the United Kingdom; there, however, the
discussion is focused on disclosure rules in general and is also very much centered around
tax issues and less on increasing the informational content of performance disclosure. See
generally WALKER, supra note 2.
27 Felda G. Hardymon, Josh Lerner & Ann Leamon, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Valuation and Distribution in Private Equity (HBS Publishing Case No. 9-803-161;
Teaching Note No. 9-805-049) (Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
=954266.
28 See INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL VALUATION GUIDELINES
(2006), http://www.privateequityvaluation.com/documents/Intemational PEVCValuation
_Guidelines Oct 2006.pdf [hereinafter IPEV GUIDELINES].
29 Id.
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in October 2006.30 The goal was to ensure that the need for greater
comparability across the industry is covered and the alignment of reporting
standards between U.S. GAAP and International Financial Reporting
Standards is fulfilled. 31 Throughout these recommended guidelines, the
reporting quality seems to have increased.32 In addition, their official
acceptance in the industry increased. In their study, the European
Investment Fund (EIF) asked the funds in its portfolio if they comply with
the new IPEV guidelines. 33 Nearly eighty percent responded that they will
adopt the new guidelines.34 The authors also tested for the degree of
compliance and the impact of the new guidelines on valuations of PE
funds. 35 Their findings suggest a positive relationship between following
the guidelines and the reported IRR.36 However, this needs to be handled
with caution due to sample selection biases and time effects which are not
taken into account.
There are currently two types of relevant valuation guidelines in the
PE industry, both of which follow the same principles (see Table 1, infra,
for a comparison). Overall reporting and disclosure standards complement
these valuation guidelines.37 It therefore suffices to discuss in more detail
the IPEV guidelines proposed by a large number of regional industry
associations. 38  The key principle behind these guidelines is to apply
methods that aim to determine fair value. 39 In order to do so, a number of
different valuation methods are proposed. Valuation can either rely on (1)
Price of Recent Investment; (2) Earnings Multiple; (3) Net Assets; (4)
Discounted Cash Flows or Earnings of underlying business; (5) Discounted
Cash Flows from the investment; and (6) Industry Valuation Benchmarks.40
To select the appropriate methodology "[t]he valuer should exercise his or
her judgment to select the valuation methodology that is most
appropriate.... 4  Over time "[m]ethodologies should be applied
consistently from period to period, except where a change would result in
30 Id.
31 Id. at 7.
32 Pierre-Yves Mathonet & Gauthier Monjanel, Valuation Guidelines for Private Equity
and Venture Capital Funds: A Survey, 9 J. ALT. INV. 59, 59 (2006).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 60.
31 Id. at 67.
36 Id. at 67.
37 See, e.g., EVCA, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE
PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY (2005).
38 See IPEV GUIDELINES, supra note 28.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 14.
41 Id. at 13.
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better estimates of Fair Value. 42 For all different methodologies, detailed
rules are developed on how to use and/or adopt the different methods. 3
This gives significant leeway to the GP.
A brief discussion of the main methods of determining fair value and
their inherent difficulties provides insight." First, when using the price of
the recent investment, the fact that different rights are attached to the new
and existing investments matters for determining the price. Significant
uncertainties are associated with assessing the economic value of these
rights, which opens up room for subjective judgment. With earnings
multiples it is suggested that "comparable" multiples be used while taking
into account that earnings multiples are adjusted for differences between the
comparator and the company valued (e.g., for risk and growth prospects).45
It is therefore not only the choice of the "comparable" company but also the
way adjustments are undertaken that leaves substantial room for
interpretation. Method three, valuing net assets, requires one to take into
account that a substantial degree of the assets of portfolio firms consists of
intangible assets which easily distort this valuation principle. Using
discounted cash flow methods is without doubt theoretically sound.4
However, choosing the proper input data is inherently difficult, especially
for the portfolio companies under consideration. Given the high degree of
uncertainty in the environment under discussion, this method is very
sensitive to discount and terminal growth assumptions. Using industry
benchmark principles would mean that the same difficulties apply as with
comparable multiples. Thus, there is obviously the danger that all the
methods could, under the given circumstances, give rise to any desired
valuation.
Table 1 provides a short comparison of the main differences as well as
common features of the IPEV and the NVCA valuation guidelines.
42 Id. at 14.
41 Id. at 25-26.
44 See Hardymon et al., supra note 27 (providing a more extensive discussion of some of
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF NVCA AND IPEV GUIDELINES
This table provides an overview on the differences and similarities of the NVCA and the
IPEV reporting guidelines; most importantly in issues like frequency and methods.47
NVCA IPEV
General Objective Fair Value Fair Value
General Disclosure Yes Yes
Frequency of Reporting Quarterly basis Periodic
Methods *Cost/latest round of *Price of recent
financing investment
oPerformance multiple eEarnings multiple
.DCF (only in limited eNet assets
situations) eDCF
eNet assets valuation 9Industry valuation
elndustry-specific benchmarks
benchmarks
Consistency over Time Be consistent until a new Methodologies should be
methodology provides a applied consistently from
better approximation of period to period, except
the investment's current where a change would
Fair Value. result in better estimates
of Fair Value.
Type of Information Valuation Valuation
C. Brief Evaluation of Valuation Guidelines
Valuation of PE investments is inherently based on forward-looking
estimates and decisions with respect to market conditions and the
underlying business itself. The problem is that a public market, which is
crucial in translating information into proper valuations, might exist only
rudimentarily or not at all. The question therefore centers on the extent to
which the industry guidelines help provide truthful reporting of PE funds
towards their investors. Two matters are worth noting. First, the reporting
guidelines, by stressing the need to apply consistent methods over time,
improve the comparability of data provided inter-temporally. Any
deviation from a given method must be explained and justified. In addition,
providing guidelines to the entire industry increases the level of
transparency by allowing comparisons across PE funds. If, for example,
most PE funds use multiples of five in a given industry, it becomes
significantly more difficult for a PE fund to permanently justify a multiple
of eight in the very same industry. Second, despite the entire set of
47 IPEV GUIDELINES, supra note 28.
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principles and guidelines (and even if properly applied), there is significant
room to maneuver for the PE managers. This is especially true of venture
capital investments and their high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, there
remains plenty of room for PE funds to willingly misinform their LPs.
Two questions remain. First, is sticking to valuation at cost rather than
at Fair Value an alternative that can overcome the potential problems
associated with fair value reporting? Valuation at cost certainly does not
overcome one of the most often observed sources of over-reporting (see our
next section), namely, the lack of write-downs in market downturns.
Further, the potential remains for providing less than adequate information
to the investor. Given that the LPs receive information about cash flowing
into the company, they may use this as an indicator of cost valuations on
their own. The second question, namely whether there are any other
possibilities to mitigate this problem, is left to our final discussion.
III. MAIN PROBLEMS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A number of public institutional investors in the United States came
under legal pressure in the second half of 2002 to disclose the performance
of PE and venture capital funds in which they had invested.48 For instance,
the Californian pension fund CalPERS lost its case and published IRR data
for its investments in the PE industry on its website. 49 In the aftermath, a
number of PE funds decided to restrict access to funds for certain publicly
accountable investors.5 °
This incident highlights potential conflicts of interest arising between
investors (LPs) and PE funds (GPs). Whereas investors, especially if
publicly accountable, are interested in more transparent disclosure rules and
policies, PE firms consider this as a threat to their business model, which is
focused on illiquid investments and discontinuous trading, and hence
valuation.
There is not only a conflict of interest between investors and PE firms
as to whether performance data should be disclosed, but also as to how
firms and investments should be valued. Obviously, with exited
investments the measurement of performance is relatively straightforward
(if one neglects all the issues associated with the IRR measure). 5 With un-
48 Industry Snapshot, EVCA BAROMETER, May 2003, at 1.
49 Chaplinsky, supra note 7, at 3.
50 Id. at 4.
51 See Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around
the World, J. INT'L Bus. STUD. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssm.com
labstract=-514105 (presented at EFA 2004). For subsequent consistent evidence, see also
Ludovic Phalippou & Mario Zullo, Performance of Private Equity Funds: Another Puzzle?
(EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Working Paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=47322 1. For follow-up, more recent work that is likewise
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exited investments, valuation is far less straightforward and hinges to a
large extent on the discretionary power of the PE manager. 52 Many PE
firms have valued their companies at the higher of cost (as given by the
most recent investment) or market value as determined by the most recent
outsider-led financing round.53 With rising valuation during the time of
investment this valuation policy leads to positive surprises at the time of
exit. With falling firm values the degree and speed of write-downs
becomes crucial: Besides reflecting overly-optimistic portfolio values (with
the associated signaling effect on potential investors as discussed below),
this might also have an effect on the compensation scheme of PE managers
and thus, in turn, might affect their incentives to undertake write-downs or
delay them into the future. The two major sources of the GPs' income are
the performance-independent management fee and the carried-interest
which allow the GPs to participate in superior performance. However, if
unexited investments are overvalued (e.g., kept at costs while their true
value would have required a write-down below costs) realizations of
superior performance with exited investments may potentially lead to
excess distributions. The GPs then receive a larger share of total
accumulated excess returns than what they should have received based on
the true value of the portfolio. So-called claw-back distributions, by which
the GP is required to pay back excess distributions, do compensate for this.
But in order for this to be effective, claw-back requires that the money still
be available and not depleted for private purpose. In the latter case, claw-
back provisions become ineffective. Hence, this creates potential conflicts
of interest between the PE managers and their investors.
Over-reporting is also not in the interest of institutional investors such
as CalPERS which are themselves forced to report to their investors since
this may lead to sudden changes in portfolio value which are difficult to
"sell" to third parties.
Further conflicts of interest arise due to inter-organizational structure
in the PE firms which are not homogenous entities. For instance, they
might stem from internal promotion schemes in the PE organization as well
as from long-term involvement of particular managers with the firm. These
consistent with this evidence, see, e.g., Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Ludovic Phalippou,
Private Equity Investments: Performance and Diseconomies of Scale (U. Amsterdam and
INSEAD Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1344298.
52 See, e.g., Can Kut, Bengt Pramborg & Jan Smolarski, Managing Financial Risk and
Uncertainty: The Case of Venture Capital and Buy-Out Funds, 26 GLOBAL Bus. & ORG.
EXCELLENCE 2, 53 (2007); see also Mike Wright, Sarika Pruthi & Andy Lockett,
International Venture Capital Research: From Cross-Country Comparisons to Crossing
Borders, 7 INTL J. MGMT REv. 7, 135 (2005), available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk
/business/cmbor/working/200506b.pdf.





conflicts then reduce the incentives to truthfully report a reduction in the
value of particular portfolio firms.
But even if drops in firm value are neglected, there are significant
problems associated with valuations at cost or market value. If in new
financing rounds new outside investors join the investment syndicate, it is
highly unlikely that this will come as a plain investment that demands cash
flow rights in return for capital infusions only. Rather, new investors
typically demand new or additional control and decision rights.5 5  It
therefore becomes difficult to compare different series of equities (with
different decision and control rights) and to monetize the inherent value of
the decision and control rights. As indicated above such issues are reflected
in industry guidelines as well.
Another primary source of conflicts of interests arises between PE
funds and potential future investors (LPs). The main asset of PE managers
is their track-record. First-time PE managers in particular cannot rely on
the past performance of successful PE funds. Instead, they have to rely on
the performance of their current fund. Negative performance of the current
fund is a negative signal, which makes the closing of future funds more
difficult. These mechanisms increase incentives for first-time PE managers
to over-report the valuations of unexited investments. This is especially
true for PE managers who are under pressure to fund a follow-on fund and
who lack the track record of completely dissolved funds; the conflict of
interest with respect to a reporting of a "fair and true" value of the unexited
portfolio firms is obviously most pronounced in this case (see also our
discussion below).
IV. INCENTIVES FOR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE VERSUS
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
If there are sufficient incentives to induce proper, voluntary disclosure
of performance measures and valuations, the above mentioned problems
could be resolved via the market place without any interference through
either standard/guideline setting or regulation. 56 In order to shed light on
whether sufficient incentives exist in the PE market and the PE industry, the
55 See DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY
CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); Carsten Bienz & Uwe Walz,
Venture Capital Exit Rights (LSE Working Paper, 2007); Douglas J. Cumming & Sofia A.
Johan, Preplanned Exit Strategies in Venture Capital, 52 EUR. ECON. REV. 1209 (2008),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=918979#; Steven N. Kaplan
& Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003).
56 See generally Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial
Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research
(Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1 105398.
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following Section discusses incentives and potential mechanisms implying
that potential benefits exceed the voluntary costs of disclosure.
We proceed in three steps. First, we address the factors that affect the
degree and quality of the firm's disclosure to the PE fund. In order to be
able to disclose and report proper valuation to the investors, PE managers
need to be accurately informed as to the economic value of their portfolio
firms. PE firms are by no means uninformed outside investors in their
portfolio firms. This view contrasts-at least to some extent-with
comments of PE representatives. A representative stated that, "[v]aluation
of private, venture backed company's stock is a process which at best is
costly, complex and inexact. Absent new rounds of financing, venture
capitalists rarely have information upon which to base changes of the set
stock price because the stock is not tradable ... The question therefore
arises as to whether this is true in general for non-listed stocks in PE
portfolio or only for rather early stages of investment (a question which we
will also address from an empirical point of view in the next section).
In any case, the degree of disclosure of the portfolio firm's
management may lead to an enhancement of the PE firm's level of
information. Additionally, and even more importantly, it allows third
parties (potential PE investors into the portfolio firm, auditors, and LPs) to
reduce informational asymmetries.
Second, we look into the potential benefits and costs of PE investors,
which affect their willingness to properly disclose performance information
to their investors. The main question in both steps is under which
circumstances there are sufficient incentives for proper voluntary
disclosure.
Third, we look into the implications as well as the costs and benefits of
binding industry guidelines and regulation for the disclosure of financial
figures from the portfolio firms to the PE firm as well as of PE firms to
their investors.
A. Disclosure of Firm Specific Information
From a theoretical perspective, it has been often argued that there are
strong incentives to voluntarily disclose information in order to avoid
negative signals conveyed to outsiders if voluntary disclosures are not
made.58 The most notable benefit for firms seeking PE (or having already
PE investors on board) is the positive effect of corporate disclosure on the
57 Independence of the Financial Accounting Standards Board Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, 108th Cong. 3 (2004)
(statement of Mark Heesen, President, Venture Capital Ass'n).
58 See Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN.
323 (1980); see also Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems
and Applications, 12 BELL J. EcON. 380 (1981).
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cost of capital. Firms then have an incentive to voluntarily report and
disclose value relevant information truthfully. For instance, Merton makes
the point that disclosure by lesser-known firms can make investors aware of
this firm and thereby enlarge the firm's investor base. 9 In the context of
PE, better quality reporting may reduce the screening costs of PE firms and
thus make the respective portfolio firm more attractive for investments.
Increased disclosure is not, however, without cost. It requires higher levels
of financial expertise and knowledge, higher preparation costs and can also
have indirect costs, as information made public and provided to investors
can be used by competitors. This reduces the firm's disclosure incentives.60
The existence of multiple audiences, however, might also induce
acceleration of announcing bad news, e.g., in order to deter competition.61
It is not fully clear whether the fact that PE funds are insiders in their
.. portfolio firms after they have invested leads to more or less incentives to
disclose information publicly. On the one hand, there may be less need
because the main investor is better informed. Revealing less information
may imply for the firm's management that it receives less valuable advice;
revealing more information may, however, imply more stringent
monitoring. Thus, it depends overall on how "management friendly" the
monitoring PE investor is perceived to be. The friendlier the PE firm is
perceived to be toward management,62 the more willing the firm's
management should be to disclose information. On the other hand, more
disclosure may attract more new investors, which is in the interest of the PE
firm seeking either new investors for future financing rounds or a way to
exit.63
B. Determinants of Potential Reporting Biases of PE Funds
Even if PE managers are sufficiently informed of the value of their
portfolio firms, this does not necessarily imply that they will report in an
unbiased fashion to their own investors. The PE manager faces a basic
trade-off: on the one hand, intentionally reporting excessively high
valuations (e.g., by intentionally delaying write-downs) may increase the
59 Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete
Information, 42 J. FIN. 483, 503 (1987).
60 See Esther Gal-Or, Information Sharing in Oligopoly, 53 ECONOMETRICA 329 (1985);
Robert E. Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 179 (1983).
61 See Masako N. Darrough & Neal M. Stoughton, Financial Disclosure Policy in an
Entry Game, 12 J. ACCT. & ECON. 219 (1990); Alfred Wagenhofer, Voluntary Disclosure
with a Strategic Opponent, 12 J. ACCT. & ECON. 341 (1990).
62 See Ren6e B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217
(2007).
63 There are a number of further benefits and costs of disclosure (see Leuz & Wysocki,
supra note 56) which, however, do not actually apply to firms being engaged in the PE
markets.
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probability of raising a follow-on fund successfully. On the other hand,
reporting excessively high valuations may lead to a potential loss in
reputation, often considered the main asset of the PE firm vis-d-vis its own
investors.
In a nutshell, this basic trade-off can be considered to be a repeated
game between investors, both current and potential, and the PE firm. Due
to an uncertain endpoint it can be considered as an infinitely repeated game.
The PE firm faces the problem of either playing cooperatively (i.e.,
reporting truthfully) or cheating (i.e., intentionally reporting too high
valuations). Whereas in the former case it will keep its reputation and can
also earn the cooperative payoffs in the future, in the latter case, if detected,
it will lose its reputation and earn strictly lower profits in the future. The
likelihood of detection depends on whether investors can distinguish
between external factors leading to a reduction in value and over-reporting.
The loss, or to be more precise, the discounted value of this, has to be
compared with the one-time benefit of cheating which increases the
probability of receiving funding for the follow-on fund. In more formal
terms, cheating (i.e., intentionally over-reporting) is optimal if benefits
exceed costs.
The decision to intentionally over-report is therefore driven by factors
which determine this basic trade-off. Reputational concerns are most
affected by the track record of the PE fund and manager. More experienced
fund managers have more to lose and relatively less to gain (since they can
use their proven track record rather than overvaluations) in order to
convince investors to put up capital for a follow-up fund. In contrast,
inexperienced PE managers have an incentive to grandstand and over-
report. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the case of IPOs. 64 In
addition, the likelihood of detection is, given our above framework, clearly
related to the age of the firm as well as to the age of the PE fund. With
regard to early-stage investments, there are many other sources of
uncertainty which external investors cannot easily oversee and are therefore
very difficult to disentangle ex-post from over-reporting. Similarly,
investments early in the lifetime of the funds give PE managers more time
until exits have to be realized. Hence, both factors give rise to more
pronounced incentives to over-report, or to delay write-downs.
Further factors affecting the above trade-off are market factors in the
PE industry and accounting standards. The PE industry is characterized by
cyclical movements 65 throughout which money inflows differ significantly
over time. With more money pouring into the industry, funding of follow-
on funds is facilitated, reducing incentives to overstate non-exited
6 See Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN. ECON.
133 (1996).
65 See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (1999).
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investments in the portfolios of existing funds. The link to accounting and
reporting standards is more indirect. Since PE funds are organized as
partnerships in most cases, they are basically unregulated in every country,
implying that financial reporting standards do not apply (see above)
directly. Accounting and reporting standards may, however, affect the
reporting and disclosure behavior of PE funds indirectly via the reporting
standards in place for the portfolio firms only. More stringent reporting
standards make it more difficult for PE funds to avoid write-downs and
report potential losses associated with their portfolio firms.
C. Financial Standards, Disclosure, and Regulation
Insufficient incentives for voluntary disclosure are a necessary but by
no means sufficient condition for mandatory disclosure or some degree of
regulation in this area. The first step towards a justification of mandatory
(regulated) disclosure is that a market failure exists. If that is the case, it
needs to be shown that mandatory valuation standards and disclosure
achieve better outcomes.
There are two objectives behind potential regulatory intervention in
this regard. The first objective is to inform the current investor properly
about the true value of the current portfolio and his share therein. The
second objective is to avoid the misallocation of capital flowing into the PE
industry and thus into individual funds due to grossly overstated returns.
There are two sources of market failure which cannot be easily
covered with private contracts: first, the existence of externalities imposed
on other players in the industry by misreporting funds. Second, and related,
is the lack of any credible direct sanctions being imposed in the case of
fraud and misinformation. A third argument in favor of regulation is that
mandatory principles of disclosure of performance information are a
cheaper solution compared to market solutions. Given the high degree of
uncertainty and complexity associated with valuing venture capital
investments in particular, it seems to be rather unlikely that state
bureaucrats are better equipped than industry professionals with setting up
sensible rules and guidelines for the reporting of fair values of portfolio
companies to investors. Redirecting the reporting standards towards the
mandatory reporting of liquidation values may lead to a simpler valuation
process and may therefore save resources, but clearly does not fulfill the
overall objective of informing current as well as future investors of the
underlying true value of the PE investment.
The first argument for mandatory reporting and disclosure standards
displays the view that, in the absence of regulation, information production
by the private sector may lead to misreporting. This will invoke negative
externalities on other players in the industry, most notably other PE funds
(for which it becomes more difficult to raise funds) and potential investors
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(which may channel too much capital into the industry and thus to the
"wrong" finds). While there is little doubt that such externalities exist,
given the difficulties with setting up a consistent and binding fair value
reporting scheme in the PE industry (see also the arguments above), it is
highly questionable whether mandatory regulatory approaches are superior
to private sector efforts to tackle this problem. 66 There is a definitive need
for transparency in order to reduce transaction costs. But since potential
investors in PE are typically either well-informed or capable of gathering
proper information (e.g., through gatekeepers and other specialized
intermediaries) there is no necessity to protect these investors excessively.
It should be noted that this is obviously a clear reason for limiting the direct
access of small investors to PE funds; but not a convincing one for
mandatory disclosure and regulation overall. The second argument for
regulatory intervention, namely that mandatory reporting and disclosure is a
credible commitment with respect to sanctions, is not very convincing
either. There are market mechanisms, such as loss of reputation, signaling
effects stemming from deviating from industry guidelines, etc., which may
help to overcome this problem. In contrast, given the problem of detecting
fraud and misreporting, it is not really clear why a mandatory regime may
provide a more efficient solution to this.
Overall, this implies that there are obviously a number of significant
problems associated with reporting and disclosure based on industry
standards which give a lot of leeway to the fund manager applying them.
But, despite this, given the limited justification and effectiveness of
mandatory disclosure rules, there seems to be little ground for public
intervention regarding financial reporting and disclosure of financial
performance (this by no means embraces other measures, such as the ones
which are directed towards achieving more transparency on corporate
governance and on financial structures in the portfolio firms).
V. DISCLOSURE AND REPORTING PATTERNS OF VENTURE-
BACKED PORTFOLIO FIRMS
Given the incentives to voluntarily disclose information and the
existence of reporting standards, it is important to understand whether the
financial reporting of portfolio firms reflects to some degree the underlying
value of the firm. Or to put it more succinctly: Are PE managers really
fishing in murky waters without additional information, or can they infer
value-relevant information even from the financial reporting of the portfolio
firm?
The empirical answer to this question is somewhat ambiguous. Using
66 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. Rrv. 1047 (1995), for a similar argument with respect to listed companies.
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a panel of U.S. biotech firms, Hand explores the value-relevance of private
firms. 67 He shows that, with the exception of firms at the beginning of their
life-times, financial statements are value-relevant in the venture capital
market. 68  He finds that the value-relevance of financial statements of
private venture-backed firms is nearly of the same magnitude as in the
public equity market. 69 Firms' financial statements are value-irrelevant for
the initial stock series but become progressively more value-relevant as
firms mature. 70  This suggests that PE investors can indeed extract
information from financial statements, except for early-stage and seed
investments. Armstrong et al. confirm and extend this view. 71  They
analyze a broader set of venture-backed early-stage companies in different
industries and find that financial statements are significant not only for the
levels variables, but also for the change of valuations.72  "Changes in
financial statement variables are contemporaneously associated with
changes in PE valuations., 73 The result is that items in financial statements
of successful firms, such as cash outlays, provide a reliable predictor of
future success, and hence the implied value of the firm.
All this clearly indicates that even for early stage investments, PE
firms can infer information concerning firm valuation from financial
statements of successful firms (which are finally exited via an IPO). There
is, however, one important caveat: major valuation problems arise for the
unsuccessful venture-backed firms which call for potential write-downs.
The above studies focus only on successful firms which are exited via IPOs.
We are not aware of any study investigating the relationship between
financial disclosure and valuation for unsuccessful firms.
A related question to our above discussion is whether the actual or
potential involvement of PE investors has an impact on the quality of
disclosure of the firm. Beuselinck et al. address this question by using a
sample of Belgian PE-financed companies.74 They show that firms do not
reveal more information before receiving PE investments compared to their
non-PE counterparts. 75 However, after having received PE financing, these
67 Hand, supra note 5.
68 Id. at 634.
69 Id. at 633.
70 Id. at 637.
71 Chris Armstrong, Antonio Davila & George Foster, Venture-Backed Private Equity
Valuation and Financial Statement Information, 11 REV. ACCT. STUD. 119 (2006).
72 Id. at 120.
71 Id. at 121.
74 Christof Beuselinck, Marc Deloof & Sophie Manigart, Private Equity Investments and
Disclosure Policy, EUR. ACCT. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 12), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=616625.
71 Id. at 30.
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(unlisted) firms voluntarily disclose more information.7 6 This is consistent
with viewing PE firms as being management friendly as well as with the
notion that the PE investments lead to a professionalization of the firm.
They also find a positive relationship between PE ownership and the degree
of disclosure, but only for very high PE ownership levels. Overall, this
implies that ownership structure has an impact on the degree of financial
disclosure in the sense that closer-held firms seem to disclose more
financial information than others.
A. Reporting Biases of PE Funds Valuation
In a final step, we aim to shed some light into the empirics of financial
reporting and disclosure in the PE industry. We thereby focus on the main
aspect of the entire discussion: the reporting of values of unrealized
investments. This is difficult for at least two reasons. First, there is a
shortage of useful applicable data. Looking at valuation at the fund level is
clearly a first step 78 which, however, only gives indirect hints as to whether
(and under which circumstances) PE funds do indeed overstate the values of
their unrealized investments. An important further step is to look into
returns and valuations at the level of the individual portfolio company. This
second step provides some first indications about the differences in reported
returns between realized and unrealized investments.
We use data provided by the Center of Private Equity Research
(CEPRES). The CEPRES data set consists of a very large proprietary PE
data set which provides detailed information about returns realized and
reported at the level of the individual portfolio firm. 79 CEPRES was jointly
founded by one of the largest European fund-in-fund investors and Goethe-
University of Frankfurt am Main. 80 Its main purpose is to collect data with
the help of the worldwide operations of the fund-in-fund investor who is
engaged in venture capital as well as in PE investments. 81 The data comes
from venture capital and PE funds that our fund-in-fund investor was in
contact with, and includes not only funds in which actual investments were
undertaken, but also those funds in which the fund-in-fund investor had a
potential interest to invest.82 The data summarized in Table 2 comprises the
76 Id.
77 Christof Beuselinck & Sophie Manigart, Financial Reporting Quality in Private Equity
Backed Companies: The Impact of Ownership Concentration, 29 SMALL Bus. ECON. 261,
271 (2007) (discussing the authors' finding that increasing PE ownership stakes are to some
extent substitutes rather than complements for corporate disclosure).
78 See Lopez de Silanes & Phalippou, supra note 51.
79 See Center of Private Equity Research, http://www.cepres.de/.





total current CEPRES database and consists of data from 322 venture
capital funds, 102 venture capital firms, 9907 observations for
entrepreneurial firms for thirty-eight years (1971-2008), and sixty-one
countries from North and South America, Europe, and Asia. The data are
completely anonymous. For reasons of confidentiality, names of funds,
firms, and other identifying characteristics are not disclosed. 3 With
hindsight, comparing the average and median IRRs of unrealized (average:
19.14%; median: 0.02%) versus realized (average: 29.91%; median:
13.53%) investments do not initially seem to indicate that PE funds
overstate the valuation of their unrealized investments. Table 2, however,
reveals that the return data are highly skewed and that most, but definitively
not all, unrealized investments are kept in the books at the cost of the
investment (only 8% of all unrealized investments in our sample are valued
at below the costs of investment, implying a negative IRR).
TABLE 2:
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9907 19.14 0.02 12216 29.91 13.53 -4.18 -5.25
5425 21.01 0.00 5188 27.37 8.97 -1.70 -2.40
4482 16.88 2.01 7028 31.79 15.16 -4.15 -3.66
1299 22.84 8.21 1809 30.30 18.74 -1.41 -1.99
8595 18.57 0.00 10407 29.84 12.40 -3.93 -4.32
cont. below
1606 6.83 0.00 1641 18.68 -45.30
1003 15,21 0.00 1166 15.84 6.98




83 We should note that the return data displayed suffer from the typical shortcoming of
return data based on internal rates of returns. Nevertheless, we think that they are very
valuable for our illustrative purposes and do not distort matters structurally.
84 Data in the table comes from Center of Private Equity Research, http://www.cepres.de/,
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Table 2 (Continued)
Unrealized/ Partially Fully Realized
Realized Difference Tests
Portfolio Firm Portfolio Firm (t-Values)
Investments Investments
Average Median Average Median
IRR IRR IRR IRR
#Finns (in %) (in %) # Firms (in %) (in %) Means Medians
Portfolio FirmPart C cont.
Characteristics
Later 504 27.38 0.00 476 65.48 12.89 -2.09 -0.71
LBO 613 17.19 14.20 451 29.67 24.37 -2.91 -2.38
MBO/MBI 1729 30.37 10.88 2495 44.34 27.51 -2.77 -3.30
Mezzanine 6 -24.42 -37.32 11 26.04 31.94 -2.73 -3.74
Seed 333 4.63 0.00 393 -1.83 -57.55 0.47 4.21
Special Situations 0 1 22.65 22.65
Spin Off 11 6.25 0.00 7 -9.99 -89.17 0.38 2.06
Start Up 484 -2.21 0.00 509 2.70 -60.75 -0.44 5.39
Turnaround 32 70.83 49.69 51 63.14 34.86 0.20 0.38
Part D Countries
Canada 104 66.73 16.54 125 49.97 18.32 0.36 -0.04
China 312 42.18 0.00 149 -4.21 -11.43 2.78 0.69
Denmark 54 22.35 0.00 45 41.99 22.42 -1.06 -1.21
Finland 89 10.64 3.11 143 41.02 16.96 -1.85 -0.84
France 577 14.83 6.93 721 19.17 14.39 -0.62 -1.07
Germany 453 29.11 1.04 476 45.00 5.99 -0.98 -0.31
India 189 40.39 5.50 116 22.42 17.03 1.15 -0.73
Ireland 45 -0.72 0.00 29 6.67 10.82 -0.72 -1.05
Israel 161 -10.22 0.00 147 20.14 -20.39 -1.54 1.03
Italy 144 48.99 0.37 197 22.28 23.13 0.97 -0.83
Netherland 102 21.85 9.52 120 20.00 22.21 0.22 -1.48
Spain 104 12.99 6.29 125 32.69 22.42 -1.59 -1.30
Sweden 176 12.62 5.74 233 44.47 20.30 -1.96 -0.89
Switzerland 73 8.77 0.77 62 137.03 26.60 -2.18 -0.44
Taiwan 43 9.54 0.00 51 16.82 9.99 -0.38 -0.53
UK 937 21.14 4.16 1592 27.63 22.54 -1.10 -3.12
USA 5555 16.51 0.00 6866 29.42 10.41 -3.66 -2.95
Furthermore, taking a closer look at the breakdown of the data reveals
a number of interesting patterns. Most notably, there is a strong
discrepancy between the IRRs of realized and unrealized investments in the
case of early stage investments, which account for roughly twenty percent
of all observations in our data set. At this stage, median IRRs of unrealized
and realized investments are statistically significantly different. While the
median realized IRR is -45.3%, the median unrealized return is zero
percent. This result clearly contrasts not only with the difference in average
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returns (18.68% for realized and 6.83% for unrealized returns) but also
differs from the overall sample for which the difference in median returns
points in the opposite direction. This suggests that venture capital
managers are, to put it cautiously, more optimistic for their current ventures
than they should be. The same type of pattern can be observed for start-up
companies (and to a lesser extent for seed investments) where the
differences in median returns are even more pronounced. There too,
venture capital firms seem to be quite reluctant to report write-downs:
whereas the median IRR of realized investments is negative 60.75%, the
reported IRR on unrealized investments is zero percent. Two potential
factors may play a role in this observed pattern. On the one hand, the
negative number associated with realized investments in the start-up sector
reflects to some extent the downturn in the high-tech sector in the early
2000s. On the other hand, unrealized investments are younger in the sense
that they are in the portfolio for only a short period of time implying that
write-downs cannot yet be foreseen. But even when taking these factors
into account (and the second factor does not even indicate that valuations
are correct predictors), the data suggest that the valuations in the venture
capital segment are grossly overstated.
While Table 2 does not reveal any clear-cut patterns with respect to
fund characteristics, there are some significant differences and interesting
observations which can be made for different countries. Most notably in
China (and to a lesser extent in Israel) reported IRRs for unexited
investments are higher than those of exited investments. In the case of
China, this is true for the average as well as the median IRRs. In many
countries the median return is zero percent, clearly reflecting the fact that
many valuations are at costs of investment.
These comparisons suffer from differences among realized and
unrealized investments as well as from a potential selection bias.
Unrealized firms may exhibit endogenous differences compared to realized
investments. Cumming and Walz aim to overcome this endogeneity
problem by developing a two-stage approach.85 They rely on the CEPRES
data set as well, mainly the one for the 1990-2003 periods.
6
The first step in their two-step procedure is derived from a benchmark
model based on realized rates of returns, from which they derive regression
coefficients. 87 These coefficients can then be used in order to compute
predicted returns.88 In the final step, the difference between actual returns
(based on the PE's reported valuations) and predicted returns are regressed
85 Cumming & Walz, supra note 51.
86 Id. at 2, 33.
87 Id. at 16.
88 Id. at 15.
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based on a number of exogenous factors. 89
They find systematic biases in the reporting of valuations of unrealized
investments relative to the forecasted IRRs.90 It turns out that these
reporting biases can be traced back to institutional factors as well as firm
and fund characteristics. Reporting biases can be explained b' cross-
country differences in accounting standards as well as legality. This
implies that the accounting standards have, via their effects on the
stringency of reporting on portfolio firms, had an effect on the degree of
over-reporting: the more stringent the underlying accounting standards are,
the less pronounced is the degree of over-reporting. The same is mostly
true for the legal environment: better laws lead to a reduction in the
incentives to overstate the value of investments by allowing for better
contract enforcement.
With respect to firm characteristics, their analysis confirms our first
conjecture above: there is more overvaluation among early-stage firms than
at later stages of the firm's life cycle. Furthermore, it turns out that there is
more over-reporting for small firms and firms in high growth industries.93
Altogether this indicates that, given the more pronounced difficulties in
disentangling exogenous uncertainties and overvaluation, PE managers
have more pronounced incentives to overstate the value, or delay write-
downs, of firms for which the valuations are surrounded by a high degree of
uncertainty.
Finally they also find that fund characteristics matter: the younger the
PE fund, the more likely it is to observe values which are-using the
difference to predicted returns-overstated. This provides empirical
support for the grandstanding hypothesis discussed above.
VI. SUMMARY
By standing between the investor and the portfolio firms, PE funds
serve to overcome, or at least mitigate, agency and control problems. To
overcome the danger that this process of financial intermediation will lead
to an increase rather than a decrease of agency problems and informational
asymmetries, a number of incentive, control, and disclosure devices must be
put in place. 94 In this Article we have focused on the latter, namely the
89 Id. at 17.
90 Id. at 27.
91 Cumming & Walz, supra note 51, at 27.
92 See Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (discussing the indices used to measure the
quality of legal rules in differing countries).
93 Cumming & Walz, supra note 51, at 38.
94 See generally GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 65. See CUMM1NG & JOHAN, supra note




reporting and disclosure process through which PE funds aim to keep their
current as well as future investors informed. Furthermore, we have noted
that financial reporting also may affect, via the compensation structure of
the PE manager, the distribution of potential gains among the limited and
general partners.
While reporting and disclosing cash-outflows and cash-inflows due to
realization of investments is straightforward and can be addressed rather
easily, the huge challenge is the valuation of unrealized investment and
their reporting to LPs. Given that PE firms typically invest in non-listed
firms making these assets illiquid and non-tradable, valuing and thereby
forecasting the future cash flows resulting from these investments is not
only surrounded by high degrees of uncertainty and complexity, but also by
a high degree of subjective assessment. In addition, we show that there are
pronounced conflicts of interest which make truthful revelation and
objective judgment highly unlikely.
Our empirical discussion clearly reveals that there are significant
reporting biases which are especially pronounced in early stage, venture
capital investments. These reporting biases can be observed across the
globe, differing in extent because of the quality of the legal framework and
accounting standards employed by various nations.
There are, from our point of view, five main implications from our
results. First, it must be noted that valuing non-listed firms is highly
complex and more of an art than a science, especially in an early-stage
environment. Second, this does not explain observed reporting biases
which systematically tend to be in the direction of overstating (e.g., due to a
delay in appropriate write-downs) rather than understating values. Third, in
the last decade or so we have seen a larger number of industry guidelines
aimed at providing non-mandatory standards for the valuation and
disclosure of PE investments. These guidelines point in the same direction
world-wide by setting up rules to report the "Fair Values" of the unrealized
investments. But, while creating significantly more transparency and
consistency over time, there is still sufficient leeway for PE managers to
strategically over-report. Fourth, we have discussed and rejected the idea of
stringent mandatory disclosure rules and reporting standards for the
industry for two reasons: first, there is little room for truly pinning down
the valuation as there is no discretionary power for the PE managers
involved; second, there is little reason to believe that mandatory standards
can do any better than private incentives and contracts to collect
information and disclose financial reports. LPs are, and should be, large
investors with a pronounced capability of collecting and processing
information. Finally, investors should not put too much weight on the
the allocation of control rights.
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valuation of unrealized investments and should definitively avoid
compensation contracts which base remuneration on these valuations rather
than on realized cash flows. Valuation guidelines may-as we have argued
above-improve matters with regard to the valuation of unexited
investments, increase transparency, and allow for comparability. But given
the special circumstances of the PE industry, such guidelines will never be
able to (and even should not) eliminate valuation leeway for the PE
manager. The main asset of PE firms is their reputation. Investors should
not base this reputation on the valuation of unexited investment but instead
should look at hard facts: the cash flows that PE firms and managers have
realized with exited investments in the current fund or with previous funds.
